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Abstract
The focus of this thesis is to develop a risk mitigation methodology for events which
are less frequent.

This will help to prevent accidents between personnel and material

handling equipment inside a manufacturing environment. The emphasis is on mitigating
risk associated with leading indicators of an incident so that the methodology is proactive
in nature. While there are various risk prevention techniques available in the literature,
the low frequency events are overlooked very easily. Following a failure to apply regular
Risk Prioritization Number (RPN) a new Risk Prioritization Number is developed and
validated. We call the new risk assessment method as Low Frequency(LF) technique and
it uses the term ’Controllability’ as an alternative to ’Probability of occurrence’. The LF
technique with its emphasis on scheduling and routing ﬂexibility addresses this need. The
four-phase methodology is presented to enhance the risk mitigation framework. The ﬁrst
phase deﬁnes the scope by estimating near miss and events pertained to a particular area.
It also demarcates the region into nodes based on each and every entry and exit point to the
region. The second phase involves data collection utilizing the historical data and expert’s
opinion. The third phase maps the assessment of the collected data using analysis tool
in MATLAB and Failure Mode and Eﬀects Analysis (FMEA) to prioritize the risks. The
fourth phase addresses the solution based on the prioritized risks from the previous phase.
The developed framework was tested in a large manufacturing plant and the results prove
that this framework identiﬁed 10% more risk which the company had not identiﬁed which
had the possibility to cause accident which are less frequent.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Introduction

Workplace safety is one of the most critical performance measures for any manufacturing
organization: Industries need to put in place mechanisms necessary to provide a safe working
environment for their employees in accordance with the Occupational Health and Safety
Act of 1970 [36]. Injuries and fatalities lead to a loss in production hours, an increase in
operational costs, and a direct loss of revenue to the company, which counters the goals of
optimizing production output.
In 2015, [5] estimated that accidents related to transportation and material movement
accounted for 1301 fatalities.

Of these, pedestrian struck by vehicles in a work zone

accounted for 289 fatalities. Despite safety measures taken by industries, accidents involving
transportation and material handling equipment increased by 3% compared to the previous
year [4]. Accidents involving motorized land vehicles collision with other vehicle accounts
for 611 fatalities, a half of total material movement related fatalities [5]. Material movement
using large entities is an integral part of processes at heavy manufacturing industries and
requires the on-site support of personnel who supervise or help execute loading and unloading
of material or work near mobile entities. Pedestrians working in such proximity with moving
equipment are consistently exposed to danger. For example, a pedestrian walking from one
work site in the plant to another is at the risk of encountering a heavy forklift on a delivery
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route. Blind spots for the vehicle operator and low detection on the part of the pedestrian
are factors which exacerbate the risk associated with such a situation.

1.2

Risk Mitigation

Risk mitigation is deﬁned as the technique developed to control or reduce the eﬀects of
identiﬁed risks [20].

”Risk mitigation” is a standard approach towards improving risk

preparedness in manufacturing.

Risk mitigation eﬀorts often focus on measures to be

implemented in response to an incident: for example, installation of automation technology
to speciﬁcally apply to an incident spot. While this approach may work in the short-term,
it does not imply that the organization has mitigated risk in any general sense. The same
causative factor may already be at work in a diﬀerent area of the organization but in a
diﬀerent form, and the consequences of leaving it unaddressed may be as unfortunate as the
original incident.
Instead of merely reacting to incidents which are lagging indicators, organizations must
identify and address the precursors to incidents. Leading indicators are considered to be the
signal for possible future events.This can be done by studying the leading indicators of an
incident instead of the incident itself as the leading indicators can be inﬂuenced. Once the
leading indicators are known, the root causes of these indicators can be addressed, which
in turn anticipates and mitigates risk. Leading indicators are focused on implementing
future safet measures. These measures are proactive and report regular activities to prevent
incidents. Hence, the process of risk mitigation is the process of proactively identifying
and dealing with leading indicators of risk. This allows risk to be measured, solutions to be
proposed to mitigate it, and solutions to be validated regarding reducing the eﬀect of leading
indicators of risk. This framework is shown in Figure 1.

2

Figure 1.1: Risk Mitigation Process
Risk mitigation involves ﬁve diﬀerent options– accept, avoid, control, transfer and
monitor– but the decision lies with the management about which to implement [16].
Industries are committed to the creation and maintenance of a work environment with an
excellent safety record, with zero work-related injuries and illnesses. However, accidental
events lead to fatalities and irreparable losses until preventative and anticipative measures
are implemented. The risk associated with each causative factor is then estimated, leading
to the development of mitigating measures such as alternative process ﬂows. Therefore, risk
assessment techniques, which systematically assess the work area, prioritize risk, and propose
solutions to address high-risk situations, are preferred in risk mitigation studies.

1.3

Risk Assessment

[26] surveyed the literature and presented a classiﬁcation of risk assessment techniques from
2000-2009. Failure Mode Eﬀects Analysis (FMEA) [22] is one of the most widely used
quantitative risk assessment metrics. FMEA identiﬁes failure modes, or ”events”, in a work
area and assigns a risk score to each event, which enables prioritization. The performance
measure of risk as per FMEA is Risk Priority Number(RPN), which is deﬁned in Lean and Six
Sigma literature as a product of severity (S), probability of occurrence (O) and detectability
(D) of an event [2].

1.4

Problem Statement

Interaction between pedestrian and a material handling equipment in a work area is assigned
a risk score based on Risk Priority Number(RPN). The probability of occurrence (O) factor
3

rates the importance of an event on a scale of 1 to 10 depending on how frequently it has
occurred, i.e. its likelihood. The inclusion of this factor for rating risk in the context of
manufacturing industry has the following shortcomings:
• Events which rarely occur yet carry unacceptable risk, i.e. loss of limb or life, may
not be given appropriate priority since there is no notion of relative importance in the
OSD scale [22]. This is because their likelihood places them near the lower limits of
the O rating.
• While O contains information about how likely it may be that an event occurs, it does
not encode any information about whether the event may itself be anticipated and
avoided. For example, when a mobile entity is on a delivery route, a risky event along
its route may be anticipated and avoided by modifying transportation logistics. This
type of a leading indicator cannot be provided by using the probability of occurrence.
Neither of these shortcomings are addressed by existing risk assessment techniques.
The focus of this research is to develop a new Risk Mitigation methodology to rightly
prioritize events in the order of their worst-case consequence: events which are hard to detect,
impossible to avoid, and have a high potential for human injury are highest on the priority
list. The objectives of the research are:
• Developing a risk mitigation framework with the new Risk Priority Number and
integrate plant logistics with the risk assessment metric to prevent accidents in a
manufacturing environment involving material handling equipment’s and pedestrians.
• Developing an algorithm to collect and analyze data in a regular complex environment
• Developing a methodology which is proactive and transferable, and could be applied to
any manufacturing environment to prevent accidents involving pedestrian and material
handling equipment.
• Providing safety manager’s insight into possible logistical solutions for the identiﬁed
risky event.
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1.5

Scope & Limitations

The presented methodology uses a Risk Priority Number(RPN) which replaces the frequency
metric with ”controllability”.

Controllability uses details of plant logistics in its risk

estimation, based on the logic that interfaces which are diﬃcult to circumvent and severe in
their eﬀects deserve to receive prompt attention from safety experts in the manufacturing
plant. The methodology is developed with the following set of attributes
• The developed model could be applied to industries which have safety issues involving
material handling equipment and pedestrians inside the plant.
• Number of incidents are low to allow data collection; hence, data is collected in three
diﬀerent ways and it is simulated for 2 years to collect reliable synthetic data used for
analysis.
• The system deﬁned takes diﬀerent set of entities, equipments and surroundings into
consideration.
• The methodology is proactive and transferable and could be applied to any manufacturing industry.
• The framework prioritizes interfaces in the order of their worst-case consequence, i.e.
interfaces which are hard to detect, impossible to avoid, and have high potential for
human injury are ranked highest, and
• It links plant scheduling and logistics, usually employed for risk mitigation, with risk
assessment. This provides safety managers insight into possible logistical solutions for
the identiﬁed risks.

1.6

Approach

DRIVES (an acronym for Deﬁne, Recognize, Identify, Visualize, Execute and Sustain) model
forms the fundamental structure for the research problem [31]. The primary focus of the
research is to develop a risk mitigation framework for manufacturing industries to prevent
5

events involving personnel and material handling equipment.

Considering the risks in

a manufacturing environment involving material handling equipment and personnel, it is
important to develop a performance measure which quantiﬁes the risk in the order of worst
case consequences.
The general idea of the study is shown in Figure 1.2. The ﬁrst phase involves deﬁning
the scope in a manufacturing plant, and the leading factors that result in accidents such
as near miss and events must be identiﬁed. We also need to demarcate the work area into
nodes to help us in the study and also to identify the areas of concern. The second phase is
to recognize the risks associated with material handling equipments for pedestrians through
literature search, historical data and on-site observation. The third phase is to identify the
key performance measure. New performance metrics that quantify risks associated with
events will be developed and applied. The fourth phase is to visualize the current scenario
in the manufacturing plant in a simulation model which duplicates real world conditions. A
model will be developed to analyze the utilization of space, assets and equipment as well as
high-risk activities in the designated plant areas.
The results of the simulation are used to analyze the nodes which are of high risk inside the
plant, and FMEA is done to identify the root cause, FMEA will be used to rank events and
prioritize risk based on the new-found metric. Next phase is to identify alternate solutions
for each event. The ﬁnal phase would be to sustain the model in the industries by developing
a template to collect and store data for future use. The template helps to keep track and to
reduce accident rates at the plant.
The result of the study would be a comprehensive risk mitigation model which the
industries could use to predict risk-causing agents and develop a safe work environment
for workers. The model will inherently have a new RPN deﬁned and help safety team in
industries understand and mitigate accidents in the plant. The methodology is proposed
because people working in industries are being aﬀected by material handling equipment and
machines as they contribute to the second highest number of fatalities. The methodology
also will remain the best way to understand the consequence of a risk and its behaviors. The
developed methodology can help industries plan their strategies and understand the impact
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of risks and ideas to overcome them, and use the tool for training their employees to prevent
risks.

Figure 1.2: Pilot study

7

A pilot study of the methodology was conducted at a large aluminium manufacturing
plant. The study helped us to deﬁne, recognize, identify and minimize occurrences of
accidents begining with a thorough understanding of their causative factors.

The risk

associated with each causative factor is then estimated, leading to the development of
mitigating measures such as alternative process ﬂows and results were derived from it. The
inference from the study was reviewed with the plant’s safety team and validated against
their earlier results. It was then approved by the manufacturing plants safety team as it
proved to be more predictable and identiﬁed 10% more risks at high precision in a short
period of time than their ealier methods. It helped the safety team to go through their
routine work in a much simpler way. This gave a platform to identify risks and mitigate
them.

1.7

Contributions

The following contributions are made in the area of risk assessment for mobile entity
interfaces in manufacturing plants using the developed methodology:
• The methodology provides a new formula to calculate Risk priority number for mobile
entity interfaces.
• Number of incidents are low to allow data collection in a regular complex environment
hence an algorithm to collect data and analyze data is developed and tested.
• Pilot study was conducted in a large manufacturing plant and the results were validated
by the company’s safety team.
• The method links plant logistics, a risk mitigation tool, with risk assessment. This
provides safety managers insight into possible logistical solutions for the identiﬁed
risky event.
• The methodology is transferable, and could be applied to any manufacturing industry
with mobile entity interface.
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1.8

Organization of the Thesis

The thesis is organized into six chapters, including the introduction chapter. The next
chapter examines and provides a comprehensive review of existing literature on risk
assessment and diﬀerent risk techniques, along with their advantages and usage. Diﬀerent
risk techniques are compared and an in-depth analysis is provided for each. This chapter
also provides the need for a new risk assessment technique. Chapter three presents the
developed methodology including data collection, analysis, validation and application.This
chapter also describes the development of new Risk Prioritization Number to apply for
low-frequency events. A case study conducted in an aluminum manufacturing industry to
implement the proposed methodology to recognize its practical applications is presented in
Chapter four. In Chapter ﬁve, results from the LF technique and their comparison with
existing risk assessment techniques, along with discussion, are provided. Finally, Chapter
six summarizes the implications of this thesis for risk mitigation for low-frequency events. It
discusses the potential constraints and future work in this area.

9

Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1

Introduction

Improving the quality of life of people in industries is considered one of the lean goals.
Industries need to put in place mechanisms necessary to provide a safe working environment
for their employees. Failure Mode Eﬀects Analysis (FMEA) [22] is one of the most widely
used quantitative risk assessment metric. FMEA identiﬁes failure modes, or ‘events’, in
a work area and assigns a risk score to each event, which enables prioritization. The
performance measure of risk as per FMEA is Risk Priority Number(RPN), which is deﬁned
in Lean and Six Sigma literature as a product of severity (S), probability of occurrence (O)
and detectability (D) of an event [2].
Risk assessment techniques can be classiﬁed into three broad categories: quantitative,
qualitative, and hybrid, it provides an extensive survey of techniques practiced in industry
[26]. The literature provides the groundwork for developing a Risk Mitigation model which
incorporates a new risk assessment method.
This chapter reviews the risk assessment techniques and identiﬁes the factors which are
not addressed by the existing techiques. This includes both quantitative and qualitative
methods. The intention of the review is to address the following two questions (1) What
are the shortcomings of the current risk techniques? (2) Is there an approach speciﬁc to
accidents involving moving entites which gives importance to low-frequency events?
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2.2

Qualitative risk techniques

Qualitative techniques are the easiest way to identify risks. It is performed by the plant
safety experts in a periodic manner. The algorithm by which this method is performed
involves subjectivity from the plant managers perspective. Some of these techniques use
previous accident data to identify risks. An overview of some of the techniques are explained
below.

2.2.1

Checklist

It consists of questions about concerns regarding safety about operation related activities[29].
A checklist audit may be conducted by personnel who are not necessarily safety experts. [26]
states that it is systematic and could be applied to any system or operation. It is most simple
but identifying complex hazards using checklist is a big disadvantage. However, it cannot
identify events related to mobile entities and we cannot prioritize events.

2.2.2

Safety audits

It is a periodic check conducted by the safety department to identify whether saftey measures
in the plant are in place and also ﬁnd new places to install safety measures. It helps to identify
whether any process or equipment will lead to any possible hazards[1]. The reports which
are generated does not signify importance to certain events when submitted to higher level
managment. This method helps implement safety procedure but does not identify hazards
involving mobile entities with pedestrians and their location.

2.2.3

What-if analysis

It is an idea of questioning about a system or a process of what can go wrong and
consequences of it [1, 30]. It requires a experienced person to identify the consequences of
things when it goes wrong in a system. Hazards are found by utilizing information avilable
in the system [17]. It helps in identifying all the events and interfaces which could happen
inside the plant based on experience and observations. For instance a forklift carrying hot
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molten aluminium may hit a pedestrian crossing in a cross-walk as fumes coming out of the
aluminium pot may cause visibility issues and those events could be identiﬁed by What-if
analysis but when prioritizing those events involves lot of subjectivity as we do not know
which area or which risk to mitigate ﬁrst.

2.2.4

Hazop

This technique identiﬁes hazard causes and hazard consequences in operations inside the
plant [6, 21, 34] It has not been applied to mobile entity interface and maily concentrates
on design variation of the system and processess.
Some of the other qualitative risk techniques such as Task analysis and STEP technique
studies the human actions in detail and the steps that lead to failure [26]. These techniques
have set of algorithm and it is based upon that risk is identiﬁed. Reporting agencies must
provide recommendations for improvement of risk in those areas[18, 29]. Major drawback of
the qualitative technique is that, since it does not quantify risk, prioritization of risk may
not be in their actual order of importance and their seriousness may not be escalated in a
proper way to the managment.

2.3

Quantitative risk techniques

Quantitative risk techniques considers risk as a quantity and it is estimated using a
mathematical relation[26]. The ability to compute risk and assign a number to it makes
it possible to prioritize risk and design solutions which address critical areas in the
plant. It also has a scale of measurement to apply and identify risks using a particular
technique. Quantitative methods have found widespread acceptance in industry sectors such
as automotive, aerospace, nuclear, manufacturing, etc. [11, 14, 33]. Some of the quantitative
risk techniques are explained below:
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2.3.1

Failure Modes and Eﬀect Analysis

It quantiﬁes risk using the term Risk Priority Number(RPN) [3]. RPN is obtained by the
product of three terms which are Probability of occurence, Severity and Detectability and
each term uses a scale from 1 to 10 [22]. FMEA is used to identify possible failures in
a system and their root causes. It could be applied to any system. There were various
shortcoming of traditional method and one of the major shortcoming is relative importance
among O,S,and D [22].
So for events involving mobile entities which happen once in 3 years based on the scale
for Occurence(O) would be a value of 3. Even though the Severity(S) value and Detectability
of an event(D) value would correspond to 10, the ﬁnal Risk value would be 300 which based
on the scale is on the lower side and prevention of that event may happen or may not
even happen based on the managments decision. These are the actual events leading to
casualities which needs to be addressed by the industries. Regular interfaces are common
and we propose solutions for them but rare and unexpected events are the one which needs
to be addressed.
RP N = O · S · D

2.3.2

(2.1)

Proportional Risk Assessment Technique

Same as FMEA this technique [1, 15, 25] uses three terms to calculate risk which are
Probability factor, severity of harm and Frequency factor. It uses a scale of 1-10 for each
factor.[25] . This technique is used to identify hazard in operations involving humans and
machines. This technique cannot identify events involving mobile entities with pedestrians
as the frequency of exposure would be low because people are not always walking near mobile
entities and the value from scale for frequency suggests that it will have lesser value such as
3, and eventually it will fail to identify the main interfaces. Also the Probability Factor(P)
for events happening every few years is low and hence this method cannot be used.
RP N = P · S · F
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(2.2)

2.3.3

The Decision Matrix Risk Assessment (DMRA) Technique

This technique [25] uses two terms to quantify risk based upon [39] hazard probability rating
and severity of consequence. It is similar to risk matrix as it gives relative importance
to both Probability(P) and Severity(S). It can be applied to human-machine interaction.
When applying this technique to events involving pedestrains and mobile entites the risk
value would be the same for an interface at a normal junction and an interface at a blind
spot. Also the term Detectability is a crucial term to use when interfaces happen as to
diﬀerntiate normal with abnormal interfaces. So this method does not capture risks based
on importance.
RP N = P · S

2.3.4

(2.3)

Kinney and FIne

Another popular method to calculate risk is Fine and Kinney which was developed in the year
1971. It uses three factors to calculate risk which are Potential consequence(G), Exposure
factor(E) and Probability factor(P) [15]. This method is mainly for operational hazards[29].
It can be performed by experienced personnel along with workers who perform operations[24].
This technique does not have the factors to capture accidents related to mobile entites and
pedestrains as both Exposure factor(E) and Probability factor(P) both fail to capture our
desired state of rare and less frequent events.
RP N = G · E · P

2.3.5

(2.4)

Risk Matrix

The ’Risk Assessment Decision Matrix’ is one of the most reﬁned way to calculate and
evaluate risk. It uses two terms, Probability of Hazard and Severity. It could be applied
to any hazard which occur in process or system. The more reﬁned version of risk matrix
is Decision Matrix Risk Assessment technique. All interface between mobile entities and
pedestrain becomes high in probability and prioritizing becomes diﬃcult. For example a
pedestrian trying to cross a road may interfere with vehicle on the road which is similar to
14

an interference with a pedestrain and an vehicle in a blind spot. The interference at blind
spot has to be given more importance than interference on the road.
Quantitative techniques quantiﬁes risk

2.4

Summary

It can be seen that risk assessment literature provides a wide assortment of techniques
which are practiced by safety managers in an eﬀort to maintain an incident-free workplace.
The application of interest for this thesis is risk assessment for mobile entity interfaces
in manufacturing. Within the context of this application area, no single qualitative or
quantitative risk assessment method provides a combination of the following desirable
features:
• Identiﬁcation of risky events featuring material handling equipments.
• Representation of low frequency events such as interfaces between heavy mobile entities
and pedestrians in the risk metric.
• Assignment of an appropriately high risk score for mobile entity interfaces.
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Chapter 3
Risk Mitigation Model For Low
Frequency Events
3.1

Introduction

The methodology presented in this thesis, called the Risk Mitigation Framework for
Low-Frequency (LF) Events, is primarily designed to empower safety managers at heavy
manufacturing facilities.

Managers currently rely on risk assessment techniques which

prioritize risky events based on their frequency of occurrence. Based on the literature, it is
believed that this approach overlooks serious events, called interfaces, which occur rarely yet
result in unacceptable consequences.
The outline of the methodology developed to address the objectives is shown in Figure
3.1. The constituent actions in each of the methodology sections can be summarized as
follows:
• Scope: The terminology used in the methodology is outlined, along with deﬁnitions of
the risk assessment metric and the method of representing entity interactions.
• Data Collection: Visual observation on site, interviews with workers and safety experts
on site, observation of recorded video data, study of external vehicle arrival logs.
Simulation studies are done to generate a large dataset for analysis. Simulation uses
collected data and also apply standard assumptions about trends in data and design.
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• Assessment: Data analysis and FMEA are used for risk assessment.
– Analysis: Identiﬁcation of interface frequency for all types of entities, identiﬁcation of locations most involved in interfaces, visualization of severity and likelihood
for each interface type.
– FMEA: Listing of all risky situations, computation of risk associated with each
interface, use of safety deﬁnitions for risk computation, ranking of risk to enable
prioritization of solutions.
• Solutions: Design solutions to address high priority risks, validation of solutions using
risk assessment metric. Additionally, design data collection template to formalize the
process described in the previous steps.

Figure 3.1: Risk Mitigation Framework
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3.2

Scope

3.2.1

Node Representation

There would be substantial diversity and ﬂuidity in the traﬃc ﬂow patterns for each class
of entities and the work area as a whole. Thus, assessing the entire work area as a single
location was likely to lead to a compromise in the level of detail assigned to its analysis. The
work area could be represented as a collection of nodes, leading to the following desirable
features:
• Every location in the work area designated by the safety team as being of interest was
represented using a node.
• Discrete nodes in a continuous work area simpliﬁed the collection of data and simulation
of plant operations.
• The node-based approach facilitated the systematic generation of the list of potential
issues during FMEA and risk prioritization.
Node representation in a manufacturing environment consists of Pedestrian crossings,
whether designated and unmarked; material loading and unloading areas; plant entry and
exit points; and traﬃc intersections all qualify to be considered nodes.

3.2.2

Near Miss

”Near miss” is deﬁned as an event which did not end up in an accident but in the future
may lead to one. The near miss could be closely related to accident patterns, so studying
this will be an alternative measure to design a system [19]. Therefore, it is important to
collect data for near miss incidents. Near miss is more of a subjective issue, as it depends on
the observer to determine whether it is a near miss or not, so to overcome that, a measure
known as time measured to collison is used [19].
If two vehicles continue at the same speed in the same path, they are sure to collide with
respect to time. Accidents are avoided since drivers make changes in their speeds. So, data
is collected from visual observation of the site and video recordings inside the plant for a
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period of two weeks, which would be a good sample of actual traﬃc pattern in the plant. The
observer has to identify all the events that produce more than an average amount of danger.
Based on the observed events, time required for two vehicles to collide if they continue at
the present speed and on the same path is calculated [19]. The values are plotted and a
numerical value is selected based on the plot, the average speed of vehicles, and braking
capabilities. Hence, by this method, near misses can be calculated in any industry.

3.2.3

Event & Interface

An event is a transgression of policy or safety rules in the workspace under consideration. An
incident is an event which causes damage but no personal injury. An accident is an incident
which causes personal injury.
An interface is deﬁned as the presence of two or more entities at a node in the work
area. In this deﬁnition, the work area is assumed to consist of nodes, which are discrete
locations or areas where mobile entity interfaces are possible. The events discussed in this
methodology are restricted to a category called ’interfaces’. As interfaces lead to events, it
is important to consider interfaces.

Figure 3.2: Interface between pedestrian and truck
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3.3

Data Collection

Data has to be collected from the site in four diﬀerent ways:
• Interaction with safety experts and equipment operators.
• Visual observation on-site at plant-speciﬁed work hours and Observation of video from
on-site cameras.
• Historical records of previous accident data .
Using the collected data, we run the simulation to generate reliable synthetic data, which
substitutes for human visual observation.

3.3.1

Interaction with Safety Experts and Equipment Operators

Operators of equipments must be interviewed to gain a perspective on traﬃc interfaces,
operations, processes and pedestrian movement from the point of view of the personnel.
Interviews must be conducted informally with pedestrians at various nodes. Safety personnel
in the plant, including supervisors and managers, also have to be informally interviewed to
understand their concerns and their evaluation of inherent interface risks.

3.3.2

Visual Observation

Visual observation has to be carried out during hours determined to be representative of
plant traﬃc by the plant safety personnel. Raw data related to entity arrival and departure
has to be sampled at each node. The record included entity type, arrival time, previous node
location and destination node. This provided suﬃcient information to trace the route of an
entity during its time inside the work area, as and when required for analysis.

3.3.3

Observation of Video from On-Site Camera

The plant has several security cameras and an accompanying software system in which the
record of several days of traﬃc movement would be accessible. This data would be useful in
the FMEA process to:
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• develop an understanding of possible failure modes which would later be expanded,
• generate a complete description of an observed interface by replaying it as needed, and
• aid root cause analysis of interfaces.

3.3.4

Historical data from previous years

Industries put in place mechanism to report and collect previous accident data.

This

information has to studied and analysed to see which entities are prone to accidents or
near misses.

3.3.5

Simulation

Simulation was used in the methodology to achieve the following objectives:
• To generate reliable synthetic data spanning several hours or days of plant traﬃc. This
data substitutes for hundreds of hours of human visual observation and creates a rich
resource for analysis of the interface issue.
• To validate logistical, technological, or policy based solutions for risk mitigation. This
allows a solution to be tested even before it is deployed on the ﬁeld, saving time and
money for the plant.
• To identify areas of interest for a safety study in the plant.
The simulation model would be developed using simulation software. The routes/roads and
intersections–junctions where interfaces between entities are commonly seen–are included in
the model.
Simulation is used to extrapolate on-site video observations and historical data to
generate synthetic data spanning arbitrarily large periods of time, such as several hours
or days of plant traﬃc. The model runs on events and data collected in the previous steps.
This process is a substitute for the time that would have been invested by human observers in
collecting the same amount of data. The resulting volume of data is used in the identiﬁcation
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and analysis of interfaces. Simulation also gives us idea about routes and traﬃc congestion
inside the building.
Pedestrain movement is unpredictable and unscheduled.

For the purpose of the

simulation the movement of all pedestrians within the building or area is assumed to orginate
from/to operational area in the plant. Discrete simulation was used to capture plant traﬃc
and pedestrain movement. Distribution is based on the observed traﬃc data. The model
will include the time it takes for the forklift to unload the materials and a conservative time
for driving based on drivers experience. Velocity of the moving entities depends on the work
area speed limits and the entities are required to stop at all signals inside the plant.

3.4

Assessment

The collected data is used as input to a simulation model which expands the number of
data points once the distribution of entity movement has been understood. Data analysis
ﬁnds patterns and statistics of interest in the data. These assessment phases serve as input
to FMEA, which is an analysis of events and their causative factors from the standpoint of
RPN.

3.4.1

Data Analysis

Data analysis helps us to inspect and clean up available data into useful information. Analysis
connects the objective elements of the methodology, i.e. simulated and observed data, to
subjective evaluation, i.e. identiﬁcation of locations where potentially risky interfaces are
likely to be found. The starting point for any analysis is, of course, the data available for
it. A caveat in data analysis is that the quality of analysis outputs is greatly inﬂuenced by
the quality of the collected and simulated data. However, the techniques described below
remain unchanged even if the numbers input data change appreciably.
Analysis
The analysis for this study is implemented in the form of a MATLAB program. The program
allows the following ﬂexibility to the user:
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• Data from visual observation and from simulation, entered into an Excel sheet, can be
read into the program automatically.
• Names of the entities using the workspace can be changed to reﬂect the usage at a
particular space or road intersection.
• The time threshold for arrival of entities at a node to be considered an ‘interface’ can
be adjusted. The user may change the value of the threshold to make the deﬁnition of
an interface stricter or more relaxed. The program returns two types of outputs:
• Text display: Shows the number of interfaces found in data, entities involved in each
interface, and time of the interface. This is primarily for the beneﬁt of the person
running the program.
• Graphical display: Several graphs and charts, described below, are also generated by
the program. These can be saved as images for future use.

3.4.2

Low frequency (LF) Technique

A new risk assessment technique known as the Low frequency technique is developed for
events involving mobile entities. It replaces the probability of occurence term in RPN
calculation used in FMEA.
The original metric for risk calculation in FMEA is the risk prioritization number (RPN),
deﬁned by [38] as:
RP N = O · S · D

(3.1)

where O is the probability of occurrence of an event, S is the severity associated with its
occurrence, and D is its detectability from the perspective of the entities involved in the
event.
In the Low Frequency(LF) technique, the metric for RPN is replaced by
RP N = C · S · D
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(3.2)

where C is introduced as a new factor, called the ‘controllability’ of an event. An event is
henceforth just called an ‘interface’ because the utility of the formulation is motivated and
demonstrated in quantifying mobile entity interfaces.
Controllability is deﬁned as:
C=

N

Pi + Ri
,N ≥ 2
2N

i=1

(3.3)

where N is the total number of entities involved in an interface, which has to equal or exceed
2 since mobile entity interfaces are being considered in this formulation. Pi , the scheduling
ﬂexibility of the ith entity, and Ri , the rerouting ﬂexibility of the ith entity involved in the
interface.
The intent of controllability is to encode into RPN an understanding of the potential of
occurrence of an interface based on its root causes, i.e. scheduling and routing logistics. The
deﬁnition has been developed based on the observation that mobile entity interfaces happen
because of the operating schedule of entities and because of the route they are required to
take to reach their destination. An interface which is unavoidable because of the rigidity of
one or more of these factors deserves the attention of both the safety team and operational
management of a plant. This understanding, in combination with the potential severity (S)
and level of detectability (D) of an interface, delivers valuable information which can be
leveraged to mitigate risk associated with low frequency interfaces.
Based on table 3.1 scheduling ﬂexibility P is assigned to each entity in the interface on a
scale of 1 to 10. The worst case for scheduling is one in which all entities which are expected
to interface do not currently have any scheduling ﬂexibility. For example, a pedestrian may
be required to be present for loading a machine at the exact same time when a heavy forklift
arrives to deliver the material to be loaded. The value for the scheduling ﬂexibility would be
10 if the pedestrian does not have any other ﬂexible schedule. In the above case we do not
have any other option. In case a pedestrian needs to start a machine at a ﬂexible time would
have a lesser value depending on the scale. In terms of risk mitigation, the high risk score
assigned to the interface may lead to measures which allow entity schedules to be misaligned
enough to prevent occurrences of the interface. On the other hand, scheduling ﬂexibility for
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one or more entities implies that the interface can be anticipated and avoided by utilizing
the available scheduling ﬂexibility.
Table 3.1: Scale for controllability - Scheduling ﬂexibility
Scheduling ﬂexibility (Pi )

Description of ﬂexibility of schedule

10

Entity has no ﬂexible schedule

8

Entity could have a ﬂexible schedule but creates more interface

6

Entity has a ﬂexible schedule which is ineﬃcient

4

Entity has a ﬂexible schedule with restrictions

2

Entity can easily delay its action to avoid interface

Based on table 3.2 routing ﬂexibility R is assigned to each entity in the interface on a
scale of 1 to 10. The worst case for routing is one in which all entities which are expected
to interfere do not currently have any rerouting options. We can use the same example as
scheduling ﬂexibility, a pedestrian may be required to be present for loading a machine at
the exact same time when a heavy forklift arrives to deliver the material to be loaded. The
value for the routing ﬂexibility would be 10 if the pedestrian does not have any other ﬂexible
route to take to reach the location. In some other situations if the pedestrain or forklift
have an alternate route to reach its destination then the value varies depending on the scale.
However, the scale accounts for all gradations of routing ﬂexibility, including a score for an
alternative route which itself has the potential for creating interfaces elsewhere.
Table 3.2: Scale for controllability - Routing ﬂexibility

Routing ﬂexibility (Ri )

Description of feasibility of routing

10

Entity has no feasible route

8

Entity has a alternative route but creates more interfaces

6

Entity has a alternative route which is ineﬃcient

4

Entity has 1 other alternative route

2

Entity has 2 or more feasible routes
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The LF technique does not alter the scales for Severity (S) and Detectability (D) proposed
for RPN. The 10-point scales for S and D have been reproduced from their original sources.
The safety team in consultation with the plant workers decides the values for C,S and D.
The risk calculation process is completed by combining C, S, and D values into a single
RPN value using Eq. 3.2. The risk score can be interpreted using an absolute threshold
for the urgency of acting upon the information, as presented in Table 3.3. Alternately, all
interfaces recorded in FMEA can be ranked according to their RPN values, and the highest
rated interfaces can be resolved using a risk mitigation solution.
Table 3.3: Urgency level of risk mitigation based on RPN

Risk value (R)

Urgency level of required actions

700-1000

Immediate action required to prevent events

500-700

Required action earlier than 1 week

300-500

Required action earlier than 1 month

200-300

Required action earlier than 3 months

<200

Required action earlier than 6 months

3.4.3

FMEA

One of the most widely used methods which includes a quantitative assessment metric is
the Failure Mode Eﬀects Analysis (FMEA) [26, 22]. FMEA is a step-by-step approach
in which failure modes (events) are identiﬁed and their eﬀect or impact on the system is
characterized. It is a technique used for examining interface events in depth. This process
ultimately leads to the prioritization of risky events, identiﬁcation of the root cause which
may lead to disruption or accidents, and subsequently the design of solutions capable of
mitigating risk before it manifests in the form of an accident. Simulation and analysis are
used as guidelines in populating the detailed FMEA sheet. All possible failures at each
and every node on the area of study are hypothesized and their details are recorded. This
detailed evaluation of the issue helps identify the root cause of each problem.
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FMEA is an integral part which helps us identify rare events which cannot happen in
day-to-day activities. It plays a pivotal role in ﬁnding events of rare cases and helps us to
solve them. In the case of external traﬃc movement it is the simulation and analysis which
are pivotal in identifying important areas whereas inside the building it is the FMEA. Risk
priority number deﬁned in the previous section is used in FMEA to quantify risk based on
the scale deﬁned.

3.5

Solution

Solutions are proposed with the following objectives:
• To address the root causes of the highest risk priority items
• To validate a proposed solution by showing that it reduces the RPN value and hence
mitigates a risk.
To connect FMEA analysis to the appropriate solutions, it is necessary to identify the root
causes responsible for a high RPN number. Once these have been identiﬁed, the candidate
solution needs to be processed to understand if it lowers the RPN number for the plantspeciﬁc environment. There are two types of root causes which need to be enumerated:
• General: These root causes are applicable to most industries, and literature on
safety can be used to enumerate them.

Absence of policy or lack of proper

enforcement of policy (“Policy”) and improper or absent communication modalities
(“Communication”) are examples of general root causes.
• Speciﬁc: These are plant-speciﬁc root causes. Supervisors and operators working in
plant ABC in this speciﬁc case study can contribute to the enumeration of these root
causes. Blind spots at nodes (“Blind Spots”) are an example of company-speciﬁc root
causes.
After enumerating these root causes, the solution is analyzed, to assess the impact of a
candidate solution to that particular root cause. The modiﬁed RPN number is a best guess
value in this table. In an iteration of the project, a method used to estimate this modiﬁed
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number can be proposed. Proposed solution is a systems solution which takes a whole system
into consideration rather than a pointwise solution.

3.5.1

Data Collection Template

A data collection template was designed with the following objectives:
• To create a user-friendly interface for future data analysis.
• To catalog details such as the time, nature and probable cause of an interface, to
anticipate and mitigate situations which can lead to injuries to personnel or damage
to equipment.
The template has been implemented in the form of an Excel document. As seen in Table
3.6, columns of the template are color coded to distinguish the nature of the data source.
• Data in blue columns is gathered by the observation of the assessor.
• Data in green columns is based on speciﬁed scale deﬁned by the industrial standards
organizations.
• Data in pink columns denotes numbers computed using the data in blue columns.
• Data in orange columns is output data, calculated using formulas deﬁned or techniques
described in previous sections.
The collection of data described in this template will help safety managers systematically
work through the risk mitigation process and reduce risk.

3.6

Conclusion

The proposed methodology is developed with the following set of attributes
• Number of incidents are low to allow data collection, hence data is collected in three
diﬀerent ways and it is simulated to collect reliable synthetic data used for analysis.
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• The system deﬁned is complex that includes diﬀerent sets of entities, equipments, and
surroundings into consideration in the industry.
• The developed risk assessment technique identiﬁes risks which have high–but insists
on low frequency events between pedestrian and material handling equipments.
• The methodology is proactive and transferable and could be applied to any manufacturing industry.
Table 3.4: Data collection template

Time Event

Entities

Possible

interacting

cause

Category (Human, Number
Policy, Equipment, of people
Environment etc.)

Controllability Severity Detectability
(C)

aﬀected

(S)

(D)

Risk Priority
Number (RPN)
(C*S*D)

Corrective
action
required
(Yes or No)

Table 3.5: Data collection template after corrective action
Time Event

Entities

Possible

interacting

cause

Number Corrective
Category of people
aﬀected

action

New Controllability
(C1)

taken
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New
New Severity(S1) Detectability
(D1)

New RPN
(C1*S1*D1)

Chapter 4
Case Study and Validation
4.1

Introduction

This chapter applies the developed methodology in a large manufacturing industry in
Tennessee. The main objectives of the case study is to apply the developed risk assessment
metric to identify the risk associated with it; prioritize risks, so that safety managers know
which interface needs to be addressed at the earliest; mitigate risks using the developed
methodology which is dependable and sustainable from the point of view of the industry;
and validate the proposed solutions using the risk assessment metric. The idea behind
applying the methodology in an industrial area is to ﬁnd out the eﬀectiveness in an industrial
environment. The study was done inside the plant in one of the most sophisticated work
areas. The outline of the work area is shown in the Figure 4.1. The values from M1 to
M7 indicate the machines inside the plant. There are people and forklifts moving around
the facility doing their respective work and the movement of various entities on the same
road over a day and through the year creates a high potential for entities being involved in
near-misses.
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Figure 4.1: Plant Layout
Because of the nature of their product, the plant uses heavy mobile equipment to move
raw material and semi-ﬁnished products from one location inside the plant to another.
Additionally, vendors deliver raw material to multiple locations inside the facility. The
road on which this heavy equipment traﬃc operates is also shared by light mobile equipment
and, more importantly, by pedestrians. Pedestrians are comprised of workers moving from
one machine to another and managerial and supervisory staﬀ similarly moving to areas under
their purview. The entities sharing space in the plant and the abbreviations used to denote
them are shown in Figure 4.2.
Mobile entities operating within the building included pedestrians; heavy mobile entities
(HME) such as 18-wheeler delivery trucks (HE1) and large forklifts (HE2); and light mobile
entities (LME) such as small forklifts (LE1), small trucks (LE2) and utility vehicles (LE3).
Large forklifts were used for diﬀerent purposes and hence had unique ﬁttings, leading to a
sub-classiﬁcation of HE21, HE22, and HE23 for this class of vehicles. Thus, there were eight
types of entities which could potentially be involved in interfaces in the plant.
The circumstances for near-miss can be alleviated if the number of entity-entity interfaces
are reduced. An interface is described as two or more entities approaching each other on the
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road within a plant-speciﬁed time window. ABC, and industries similar to it, have a low
tolerance level for certain types of interfaces, e.g. pedestrians and heavy equipment. The
consequences of such interfaces can be dire, potentially leading to causalities and fatalities
in the workplace.

Figure 4.2: Entities inside the plant
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Figure 4.3: Methodology

4.2

Scope

4.2.1

Node representation of workspace

The entry and exit points for the Building X are called nodes, and are marked in the ﬁgure
using numbers 1 through 11. The nodes selected for this case study have been labeled in
Figure 1. All of the collected data and subsequent analysis refers to these demarcated nodes.
The traﬃc patterns in the plant could be described at a high level as follows:
• The plant was demarcated into 11 nodes based on entry and exit points and traﬃc
junctions.
• Movement of employees was observed at Nodes 11, 7, 5, and 4.
• Main entrance to the plant was at Node 5.
• Maintanence vehicles, small forklifts uses Nodes 1, 10, and 2
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• Large entities uses Nodes 5 and 8 to enter into the plant.
• Designated pedestrian crossings are available at Nodes 4 and 7.
• Trucks and pedestrians also had to cross railroad tracks inside the building X but
Nodes were not speciﬁed as it happens at a speciﬁc time under heavy surveillance.

4.2.2

Near miss

Since it is a heavy manufacturing industry, it uses heavy forklifts and trucks which carry
molten metal; hence, the speed limit inside the plant is 15mph. Data was collected from
industry using recorded videos and on-site observation to identify near misses. The time
measured to collision for each near miss event was calculated and a graph was drawn to
identify the threshold value for the near miss. The main objective is to identify in physical
terms the measurement of the danger involved in a two vehicle interaction.

Figure 4.4: Near miss
An interface was deﬁned as the arrival or departure of two or more entities at the same
node within a time window. When the data was collected and analyzed using a graph drawn
for diﬀerent near miss events, with time measured to collision, it showed that 4 would be the
right value for near miss in this industry, as it is shown in Figure 4.4. The value was obtained
based on number of ”near misses” observed, the speed inside the plant, and the time needed
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to react. In the parlance of the plant management, events within a time window of an actual
interface were ”near miss” events, which still counted as interfaces in terms of their internal
plant safety guidelines. Near misses were considered capable of translating into interfaces at
other times, since heavy equipment typically took time to slow down or stop, even during
events where it was trying to avoid an impending interface.

4.3

Data collection

Data was collected from the site in four diﬀerent ways:
• Interviews with safety experts and forklift operators.
• Observation of on-site at nodes and video from plant cameras present inside building
X.
• Historical records of previous near-misses and events in the plant.
• Simulation of a large sample of reliable synthetic data based on previous three methods
of data collection

4.3.1

Interviews with safety experts and forklift operators

Operators of heavy and light equipment were interviewed to gain a perspective on traﬃc
interfaces, operations, processes and pedestrian movement from the point of view personnel
involved in them. Interviews were conducted informally at various locations on the building
X. Safety personnel in the plant, including supervisors and managers, were also informally
interviewed to understand their concerns and their evaluation of the risks inherent in traﬃc
movement and the pedestrian interfaces.

4.3.2

Visual observation

Visual observation was carried out during hours determined to be representative of plant
traﬃc by the plant safety personnel. Data was collected from the building X on two separate
occasions, between 7:00-11:00 a.m. on weekdays, each observation period being 1.5 hours
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long. The observer used an Excel sheet to record the time at which an entity was spotted at
a node, from the time the entity was ﬁrst seen on any branch of the building X to the time
it exited any branch of the building X. The type of entity was also logged by the observer.
A representative row of data collection from visual observation is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Data collected from Visual Observation
Entity Type

Node 1

PED

Node 2

Node 3

Node 4

9:15:11

9:20:19

HE21

9:21:35

PED

4.3.3

Node 6

Node 8

Node 9

Node 10

Node 11

9:20:54

9:21:15
9:37:10

9:42:58

Node 7

9:16:13

HE21

LE1

Node 5

9.37.31

9:37:55

9:43:19

Observation of recorded video data

The plant has several security cameras inside the building X. The system records several
days of traﬃc movement and allows convenient access to recorded video. Access to this
recorded data allows for a subjective evaluation of traﬃc interfaces. For example, the video
sample from an interface can be reviewed and advanced to be able to describe the event,
evaluate its possible causative factors, and categorize it. An example of the observed video
data collection table is shown in Figure 4.2.
Table 4.2: Data collected from Visual Observation
Date and Time

Event

Possible Reasons

Category

No policy to stop him

Policy, Route, Human

A pedestrian walked
February 2, 2015

through a non-walk area

9.11 am

inside the building
across Node 3
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4.3.4

Historical data

4.3.5

Simulation

The simulation model was developed using the Anylogic simulation software. The speed
of vehicles was set to 10 miles per hour, the plant’s internal speed limit, and the speed of
pedestrians was assumed to be 2.5 miles per hour. Vehicle movement was assumed to follow
a normal distribution, peaking around the time when material was required inside the work
area.Movement of pedestrian was uniform during break hours. A triangular delay of (1,5,10)
was assumed for HE2 type forklifts, dependent on their payload. The N(mu,sigma) for the
normal distribution is based on the entity arrival at each node. It varies with entity and
node number.

Figure 4.5: Diﬀerent routes of entities
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Figure 4.6: Simulation model at node 3
The simulation was run for a period of 2.5 years, to allow enough time to observe
rare interface events. The long simulation window also facilitated a study of interfaces to
understand the involvement of nodes in interfaces, traﬃc ﬂow patterns leading to interfaces,
and similar interesting problems which may lead to a future understanding of leading
indicators of mobile entity interfaces. Simulation output was transferred to a spreadsheet to
enable further processing of data.
Generation of simulated data
Data was collected from two sources: records of arrivals of external equipment from company
personnel, and observations of equipment movement at the building X. Using statistical
analysis of the records/observations, distributions are used as simulation inputs.
Pedestrian movements are unpredictable and unscheduled. However, for the purpose of
the simulation, the movement of all pedestrians within the building X is assumed to emanate
from/to the operational area shown in Figure 2. The estimated number of passes could vary
from 200 to 300 per day. Data is generated for an arbitrary period to be considered ready
for analysis using MATLAB. There is some synchronization between the simulation and
analysis. If the analysis considers 30 seconds (for example) to be the time interval within
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Table 4.3: Generation of simulated data
Name

Total exits

LE1
PED at node 3
LE2
PED at node 5
PED at node 1
HE21 at node 5
HE22
HE23
HE22 at node 3
LE1 at node 6
PE8 at node 8
LE2
HE23 at node 6
HE23 at node 8
PED at node 8
HE21 at node 3
HE21 at node 7

9.00
68.00
9.00
8.00
70.00
0.00
7.00
4.00
29.00
12.00
37.00
9.00
3.00
3.00
14.00
38.00
79.00

Average
Time in
System
(Min)
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.09
0.00
0.10
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.09
0.05
0.03
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.05

Average
Time In
Move
Logic
(Min)
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.03

Average
Time
Waiting
(Min)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Average
Time
in
Operation
(Min)
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.02

which entities are considered interfaced, then the simulation generates arrival information
spaced 30 seconds apart. This simpliﬁes the implementation of the analysis code.

4.4

Assessment

The data is then analysed to ﬁnd statistics of interest in the data. 2.5 years of data is
assessed for completeness and accuracy. These assessment phases serve as input to FMEA,
which is an analysis of events and their causative factors from the standpoint of RPN.

4.4.1

Analysis

The relation between nodes on the Building X and the number of recorded interfaces at
each node was analyzed. The pie chart shown in Figure 4.7 reinforces the input from safety
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personnel on site: the intersection nodes (Nodes 4, 5, 7) have the highest involvement in
interfaces. Close to 50% of all traﬃc interfaces occur at these nodes.

Figure 4.7: Percentage of recorded interface in each node
The relation between entities using the building X and the number of recorded interfaces
for each entity was analyzed. The pie chart shown in Figure 4.8 does not show any speciﬁc
trend in this regard. There is a more or less even distribution of interfaces. However, two
aspects of the ﬁgure are noteworthy: the heavy vehicle entities (HE1 and HE2) together
make up close to 40% of all interfaces. Moreover, approximately 15% of interfaces involve
pedestrians. These two categories are the most sensitive from the point of view of plant
safety.
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Figure 4.8: Entities involved in interface
The analytical output motivates a closer examination of entity-entity interfaces and of
the involvement of nodes in interfaces. Entity-Entity interfaces are plotted in Figure 4.8.
The color of the circle indicates the severity of an event (gradation from Red = Highest to
Yellow = Lowest), resulting from the interface, e.g. Pedestrians and HE1 interfaces can lead
to severe incidents. The size of the circle indicates how many interfaces of a particular type
were observed. As seen in the ﬁgure, the plant has high incidence rates of interfaces with
high potential severity, clearly indicating that there are issues that need to be resolved.

Figure 4.9: A plot of near miss information in the context of likelihood and severity
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Analysis is a critical step in moving from raw traﬃc data towards the identiﬁcation of
speciﬁc places and interfaces which may demand greater scrutiny in a particular area of the
plant. This allows FMEA and subsequent solutions to focus in on a particular location of
the workspace and particular entities operating at that location.

4.4.2

Risk assessment metric

The overview for the case study and deﬁnitions used in describing the workspace indicate
that interfaces, i.e. events and near misses, are leading indicators for incidents. The risk
assessment metric used here to describe the level of risk associated with these indicators is
called the Risk Prioritization Number. RPN is deﬁned as:
RP N = C · S · D

(4.1)

where C is the controlability of an event, S is the severity associated with its occurrence,
and D is its detectability from the perspective of the entities involved in the event
High RPN values indicate that a near miss or event has high risk associated with it.
The objective of the risk mitigation methodology exercise, then, is to control one or more of
the factors in the RPN equation so that the RPN value reduces with the introduction of a
solution to mitigate risk.

4.4.3

Failure modes and eﬀect analysis

The path of every entity using the building X, from its origin node to destination node, is
noted. All the potential dangers or hazards along this path are identiﬁed. The consequences
of these potential dangers are noted, including whether it aﬀects equipment or personnel or
both. The RPN template is used to put down values for each event. The FMEA template has
a provision for stating the recommended solution so that the risk of recurrence for a potential
event is reduced. The RPN value corresponding to this recommendation is calculated to
validate it.
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Table 4.4: A sample Failure Modes Eﬀect Analysis
Potential

Potential

Item/
Equipment

Failure

Eﬀects of

Mode

Failure

Current
Severity

Potential

Controllability

Cause

Design

Detection

RPN

7

560

Control
Blind spot
for vehicle,

Event or
Pedestrian crossing

PED may be hit

across Node 11

by HE21

lack of

injury
to the

Pedestrian

10

communication,

walkway,
8

swing gates,

personal

congestion,

barricading

or fatality

low visibility,

the work area

fatigue

4.4.4

Scaling of data

For each interface event, values for three factors–the Controllability, severity (or eﬀect), and
detectability– need to be assigned relative to a scale which is based on observations and on
plant speciﬁcations. The scale is built using standards prescribed in literature and its values
range from 1 to 10. The signiﬁcance of each of these numbers on the scale for a factor is
shown in tables in the methodology.

4.5

Risk prioritization

After completion of the FMEA, all the potential events are ranked based on their RPN
value. The following events ranked the highest, validating initial observations from safety
supervisors and results of the analysis:
• The interaction between pedestrians and HE21 vehicles had a high RPN value and was
the highest priority item at node 11.
• Interaction between pedestrian and HE1 vehicles at node 11 was the second highest
item.
• Interaction between pedestrian and HE21 at node 5 was the third highest item.
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To propose solutions, the top three events are taken into consideration and the root cause
of each event is identiﬁed. The proposed solutions need to address these root causes. This
minimizes the risk associated with an event.

4.6

Solution: Information interface for work area

A prototype information interface has been designed for use by the supervisor and for visual
display screens at appropriate locations within the work area. The supervisor is constantly
mobile in the work area monitoring production operations, while simultaneously coordinating
the movement of entities. This is a high intensity job with multiple responsibilities and hence
the information interface is designed with the following objectives:
• To provide the supervisor a simple visual representation of the status of entities in the
work area.
• To provide the supervisor the ability to manually update entity statuses for the work
area.
• To provide entity operators suﬃcient information, using visual displays, to make some
independent movement decisions to reduce risk.
• To provide pedestrians using the work area complete information about entity
movement and reduce the possibility of accidental interfaces.
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Figure 4.10: Flowchart of information ﬂow
A prototype of this component of the Visual Management System is shown in Figure 4.10 .

Figure 4.11: Information Interface for the Supervisor and Visual Displays
Green spaces in the interface denote areas of the workspace which are currently
unoccupied, and entities could be moved into those areas. Orange spaces are areas where
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a speciﬁc entity (E2 and E3 in the above example) is scheduled to arrive or depart shortly.
Red spaces are areas occupied by speciﬁed entities (E1 and E3 in the above example).
The ”Done” button is for the beneﬁt of the supervisor. After making a manual update,
selecting ”Done” allows the supervisor to broadcast the status of the work area to visual
displays around the work area.
With this interface, the supervisor does not need to be physically present at a particular
location within the work area to know how it is being used. This improves the information
available to the supervisor and reduces the chances of errors due to a lapse in memory or
concentration in the high-pressure work environment.
Entity operators using the work area, especially those about to enter or exit the area,
can look at visual displays mounted inside the work area to know of the movement of other
entities. This reduces the chances of interfaces between heavy equipment inside the congested
work area.
Pedestrians using the work area may not be working in coordination with entities in their
proximity. They are not aware of the movement of entities in the current system at ABC.
With visual displays showing this interface, pedestrians gain access to complete information
about the usage and predicted movements of entities in the work area.
The primary root cause identiﬁed for this study was the inability to detect the ﬂow of
entities across the building and the signals being given by the supervisor. Thus, to bridge
the communication gap, a Visual Management System was to be placed. This system helped
to create better information ﬂow throughout the building. It changed the communication
system from a centralized communication channel, where the supervisor chose the route of
travel for all vehicles, to a more decentralized system

4.7

Solution and their impact on RPN

The template has data entry columns which allow a safety supervisor or manager to document
the action taken to mitigate the risk of the event. This course of action could be determined
using safety protocols and the experience of the supervisor. A course of action which reduces
risk can then serve as a template for the future actions to be taken in similar situations.
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Reduction in risk is estimated based on the new value of the RPN number following the
selected corrective action. The template calculates the new probability of occurrence, new
severity of eﬀect, and new detectability of the event for a selected course of action. This
results in a new value for the RPN. If RPN reduces, it shows that the risk has reduced. But
an increase in RPN shows a rise in risk.
The observed and post-action RPN numbers are indicators of the current safety situation
and areas of potential improvement within the plant. The template estimates both numbers
and provides a ready reference for safety managers and supervisors.

Figure 4.12: Impact of methodology

4.8

Conclusion

Using this scientiﬁc methodology, it is possible to identify risks with high precision in a very
short time. It helps the safety team to go through their routine work in a much simpler
way. This gives a platform to identify risks and mitigate them. The proposed methodology
accomplishes the stated goals:
• The leading indicators of incidents are identiﬁed.
• A scientiﬁc measure for risk is proposed and risks at the ABC plant are analyzed.
• A transferable methodology is developed, which can easily be extended to other areas
of the plant and to other plants.
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• The methodology is proactive; it anticipates risky interfaces and provides solutions
designed to avoid interfaces, thus mitigating the risks associated with them.
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Chapter 5
Results
5.1

Analysis

The output of the analysis from the case study provided a direct basis for comparison of the
OSD (Eq. 1) and CSD (Eq. 2) formulations for risk assessment. Probability of occurrence of
an interface could be calculated for interfaces observed over large temporal volumes of data.
Low frequency, high risk events were more likely to manifest during the large time period
for the simulation, which makes the comparison possible.
Table 5.1: Actual risk assessment inside the plant based on Low-Frequency Technique(LF)
Interface at Node

Entities Involved

P 1

P 2

R 1

R 2

C

S

D

RPN

Node 11

HE21 - Pedestrian

8

6

10

8

8

10

7

560

Node 11

HE1 - Pedestrian

8

6

10

8

8

10

7

560

Node 5

HE21 - Pedestrian

8

4

10

8

7.5

10

6

450

Node 7

HE21 - Pedestrian

8

4

8

8

7

10

6

420

Node 5

HE1 - Pedestrian

8

4

8

8

7

10

6

420

OSD has the potential to downplay serious risks because of low probability of occurrence.
An example of this was seen for the interface HE21-Pedestrian at Node 11, which had led
to an accident at the plant with serious injury to the pedestrian. This interface, based on
historical observations, had severity and detectability values, S = 10 and D = 7 respectively.
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However, it had an O = 3 rating since it occurred rarely. This resulted in an overall OSD
risk rating of RPN = 210 for the interface, lending it a low priority for risk mitigation. Table
5.2 shows the highest priority interfaces calculated using OSD, which shows that the Node
11 interface does not feature even in the top 5 interfaces identiﬁed for risk mitigation.

5.2

CSD vs OSD

The same interface was assessed using the CSD formulation. While severity and detectability
would be the same for OSD and CSD calculations, the introduction of controllability would
make it possible for RPN to highlight the seriousness of the interface. Node 11 was critical for
plant operation and under existing plant logistics, was not granted any scheduling ﬂexibility.
This gave the HE21-Pedestrian interface at that node a poor scheduling ﬂexibility P and
routing ﬂexibility R rating based on the scale provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, leading to
an overall C = 8 rating. The interface was rated at RPN = 560 using CSD, which was
the highest risk score in the work area, along with other interfaces at Node 11. Table 5.1
shows the highest priority interfaces calculated using CSD. Table 5.3 shows OSD scores
corresponding to the highest ranked interfaces using the CSD metric.
Table 5.2: Risk assessment done by the company using regular PSD based FMEA
Interface at Node

Entities Involved

P

S

D

RPN

Node 7

HE1 - Pedestrian

7

10

6

420

Node 7

HE21 - Pedestrian

7

10

6

420

Node 5

HE21 - Pedestrian

7

10

6

420

Node 4

HE21 - Pedestrian

6

10

6

360

Node 5

HE1 - Pedestrian

6

10

6

360

This table provides an insight into the similarities and diﬀerences between the two
formulations. There are frequent high-risk interfaces between heavy entities and pedestrians
at Node 7. This node has poor scheduling and routing ﬂexibility, which results in a high
priority CSD rating. Because of the frequency of interfaces at Node 7, OSD assigns a similarly
high risk priority to it. However, Node 7 and Node 11 are adjacent, and share similar values
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for severity and detectability. This leads to an expectation that interfaces between the same
entities at these nodes would be assigned similar risk priority. However, Node 11 interfaces
are relegated to low priority in OSD because of the emphasis on probability of occurrence.
At the other end of the risk priority table were interfaces between two light mobile entities
and two heavy mobile entities. Both OSD and CSD ratings give these events an overall
low RPN rating, primarily because severity or detectability values for these interfaces are
numerically low.
Table 5.3: Risk assessment at nodes which are identiﬁed as high risk by LF technique using
P.S.D based FMEA
Interface at Node

Entities Involved

P

S

D

RPN

11

HE21 - Pedestrian

3

10

7

210

11

HE1 - Pedestrian

3

10

7

210

5

HE21 - Pedestrian

7

10

6

420

7

HE21 - Pedestrian

7

10

6

420

5

HE1 - Pedestrian

6

10

6

360

The highlights of the case study were:
• An interface with a recorded accident was identiﬁed as top priority using CSD; OSD
missed it because of its rarity.
• Nodes with similar interfaces were rated similarly by CSD; OSD missed some interfaces
since they were not common.
• CSD and OSD performed similarly for low-risk interfaces at all nodes, since S and D
values were used in both formulations.
The results of the study were subjectively validated by the experience of the plant safety
team. The CSD technique did not aﬀect high frequency interfaces as 3 out of 5 highest risk
interfaces ranked by the LF technique were also rated high risk by OSD though with not
with the same ranking but very similar RPN values.
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5.3

Conclusion

The technique specializes in assessing and prioritizing risk associated with low frequency
interfaces, which are generally relegated to lower importance levels in risk assessment
literature. The LF technique is a variant of FMEA in which the formulation for RPN
calculation has been changed. The concept of controllability (C) is introduced into RPN
calculations as an alternative to probability of occurrence (O), while retaining the other
two terms, namely severity (S) and detectability (D) of the interface. Controllability is
deﬁned as a function of the scheduling and routing ﬂexibilities of the entities involved in a
potential interface. This approach deemphasizes the frequency of occurrence or exposure to
an interface, instead focusing on its causative and controllable characteristics. Results were
validated using a case study conducted at an aluminum manufacturing plant. It was shown
that the LF technique correctly identiﬁed low frequency interfaces which had resulted in past
accidents as being high priority for risk mitigation, which the standard RPN formulation
failed to do.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1

Introduction

This chapter summarizes the key ﬁndings of the thesis work. It discusses the contribution to
safety in industries, the limitations of the study, an assessment, and suggestions for future
improvements. The main idea of the thesis was to develop a comprehensive risk mitigation
framework for low frequency events to prevent accidents in the industry. Following an
intensive literature review, a new ”Risk Priority Number” was developed for low frequency
events. Generally, industry has overlooked low frequency events in safety studies, but the
consequence of this neglect can be high.

6.2

Methodological Contribution

Risk mitigation is about preventing accidents or events beforehand. It helps in modeling a
safety system without many risk-taking scenarios and also helps in training people on how
to do set of activities. The contributions of this research are as follows:
• This thesis work developed a robust framework based on both practical and theoretical
foundations.
• The model guides industries on how to deﬁne ”near miss” depending on the work
environment.
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• A new Risk Priority Number was developed for low frequency events which could be
applied for mobile entities and pedestrian interface.
• The LF technique is a variant of FMEA in which the formulation for RPN calculation
has been changed. This approach deemphasizes the frequency of occurrence or exposure
to an interface, instead focusing on its causative and controllable characteristics.
• The case study was validated in an industrial environment and proved that the risk
mitigation could be done within two weeks.
• The results prove that this method identiﬁed 10% extra risks which the company had
not identiﬁed.
Based on the assessment of features of various quantitative risk assessment techniques,
including the LF technique. Existing techniques capture a high level of detail, and can
evaluate complex events. Some are time eﬃcient, some provide an easy method to collect
data, and some are good at root cause analysis. However, for the application of interest,
i.e. risk assessment for mobile entity interfaces in manufacturing, they do not provide
the following features which are available in the LF technique: (1) Identiﬁcation of risky
events featuring mobile entities, (2) Representation of low frequency events such as interfaces
between heavy mobile entities and pedestrians in the risk metric, and (3) Incorporation of
details of plant scheduling and rerouting into their analysis and risk mitigation approach.

6.3

Practical Usage

The thesis has an important role to play in most industries. Traditionally, training in
industries regarding safety uses various tools; There is no single comprehensive tool for the
management to use to identify and mitigate risk. This proposed methodology could be that
tool. Potential uses for the methodology include the following:
• A tool for the identiﬁcation of the leading indicators of incidents.
• A scientiﬁc measure for risk in the industry, where risks are analyzed and prioritized
depending on the measure.
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• A versatile methodology which can easily be extended to other areas of the plant and
to other plants.
• A proactive methodology that anticipates risky trespasses and provides solutions
designed to mitigate the associated risks and prevent them from becoming incidents.

6.4

Direction for Future Work

The thesis emphasized the importance of understanding the risk mitigation in industries.
The model could be applied to any industries depending on the scenario. Future research
could focus on the following areas:
• The whole model could be made into a software to be used in computer application or
tablet application to automate it into a user friendly tool.
• The data collection could be made easy by ﬁxing a GPS to moving entities and
connecting it to a central server to automatically store data.
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A

Suggested rating for severity and detectability
Table A1: Suggested ratings for the severity of a failure mode [38]

Eﬀect
Hazardous

Criteria: severity of eﬀect

Rank

Failure is hazardous, and occurs without warning. It suspends operation of the system and/or involves noncompliance with government

10

regulations
Serious

Failure involves hazardous outcomes and/or noncompliance with government regulations or standards

9

Extreme

Product is inoperable with loss of primary function. The system is inoperable

8

Major

Product performance is severely aﬀected but functions. The system may not operate

7

Signiﬁcant

Product performance is degraded. Comfort or convince functions may not operate

6

Moderate

Moderate eﬀect on product performance. The product does not require repair

5

Low

Small eﬀect on product performance. The product does not require repair

4

Minor

Minor eﬀect on product or system performance

3

Very minor

Very minor eﬀect on product or system performance

2

None

No eﬀect

1

Table A2: Suggested ratings for the detectability of a failure mode [38]
Detection

Criteria: likelihood of detection by design control

Rank

Absolutely uncertainty

Design control does not detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode; or there is no design control

10

Very remote

Very remote chance the design control will detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

9

Remote

Remote chance the design control will detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

8

Very low

Very low chance the design control will detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

7

Low

Low chance the deign control will detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

6

Moderate

Moderate chance the design control will detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

5

Moderately high

Moderately high chance the design control will detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

4

High

High chance the design control will detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

3

Very high

Very high chance the design control will detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

2

Almost certain

Design control will almost certainly detect a potential cause of failure or subsequent failure mode

1
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